Globalisation and China's diplomacy: structure and process by Harris, Stuart
 Working Paper 2002/9 
Globalisation and China's diplomacy: 
Structure and process 
STUART HARRIS 
 
Canberra, December 2002 

 Published by Department of International Relations 
RSPAS 
Australian National University 
Canberra  ACT  0200 
Australia 
Tel: +61 (2) 6125 2166 
Fax: +61 (2) 6125 8010 
Email: intrel@anu.edu.au 
Web: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir 
Cover by RTM Design. 
Harris, Stuart, 1931-  . 
Globalisation and China’s diplomacy : structure and process. 
ISBN 0 7315 3125 6. 
1. Globalization. 2. China - Foreign relations - 1976- . 
I. Australian National University. Dept. of International  
Relations. II. Title. (Series : Working paper (Australian  
National University. Dept. of International Relations) ; no.  
2002/9). 
327.51 
© Stuart Harris 
 Department of International Relations 
Working Papers 
The Department’s Working Paper series provides readers with access to 
current research on international relations. Reflecting the Department’s 
intellectual profile, the series includes topics on the general theoretical and 
empirical study of international and global politics, the political dynamics 
and developments in the Asia–Pacific region, and the intersection between 
the two. 
Publication as a ‘Working Paper’ does not preclude subsequent public-
cation in scholarly journals or books, indeed it may facilitate publication by 
providing feedback from readers to authors. 
Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Department of International 
Relations are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public 
record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and 
conclusions. 
  
Abstract 
This study is concerned with how far globalisation has affected the 
capacity of China, as a developing nation, to make and implement foreign 
policy. China’s entry into the UN, the Nixon/Kissinger visits, and 
expanding membership of international institutions, meant that a 
quantitative expansion of diplomatic links was needed. The reform of 
China’s economy reflected other reasons for diplomatic change in the face 
of globalisation pressures. These changes led, among other things, to 
increased bureaucratisation, more skilled officials and more pluralism. 
The state’s power in political relations remains, but its exercise involves 
increased costs for other objectives, notably modernisation. A substantial 
cognitive learning process has occurred in the development of China’s 
diplomatic processes and structures. 
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Globalisation and China’s diplomacy:  
Structure and process 
STUART HARRIS1 
This study is concerned with how far globalisation2 has affected the 
capacity of China, as a developing nation, to make and implement foreign 
policy.3  
In any developing nation-state, the impact of these globalising influ-
ences, largely resulting from changes in information, communications and 
transport technologies, will depend significantly on that nation-state’s 
characteristics. Most states, whether developing or developed, share a 
number of foreign policy influences. Externally, these include a state’s geo-
graphy, political and security environment, and its role in the structure of 
global relations; domestically, they include population size, the economy, 
the nature of political systems (market or socialist, pluralist or authoritarian, 
Western oriented or not), and ethnic and religious influences (whether an 
homogenous society or not).  
Although often critical, being a developing country is therefore only one 
dimension among many. Important structural characteristics of developing 
countries, however, commonly include, as well as underdevelopment itself 
(notably shaping such process factors as weak institutions of governance, 
inadequate bureaucratic capabilities and technological limitations), an 
 
1  Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian 
National University. This paper is a draft chapter for inclusion in Justin Robertson and Maurice East, 
eds, Diplomacy and developing nations: Post Cold War foreign policymaking structures and 
processes (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming). 
2  See Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A critical introduction (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000); 
and Stuart Harris, Globalisation in the Asia–Pacific context, Research Paper No. 7 2001–02 
(Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002), <www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2001-
02/02RP07.pdf>.  
3  The term China means here the People’s Republic of China (PRC). When it took power in 1949, the 
Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan and as the Republic of China (ROC) 
disputed the PRC’s claims to sovereignty of the mainland. In 1971, China gained the UN seat from 
the ROC, including a permanent seat on the Security Council.  
2  STUART HARRIS  
 
underpinning ideology, external penetration, economic and political depen-
dence, and problems of internal cohesion. Commonly, the role and views of 
individual leaders and of the military and other elites have greater influence 
than in developed countries.4  
Although China is not unique, or no more so than many other countries, 
its characteristics do differentiate it from many developing countries. The 
per capita income level, even on a purchasing power parity basis, makes it 
clear that China is a developing country. Yet it is a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, has a very large population, and a GNP that even 
under conventional measures ranks it globally between Italy and France. 
These differences are important yet many of the relevant factors and the 
international pressures on them that China has experienced, and its 
responses, are common to other developing countries.  
Nevertheless, that it has the government organisational structure of a 
communist (at least nominally) or socialist state and one in which the ruling 
Party identifies itself with the state is important. This is not only in the form 
of the functional control the state exercises and how that is affected by 
globalisation but also how far the ruling Party’s control is affected.  
Although other foreign policy concerns remain important, notably its 
sensitivity to external threats, especially over Taiwan and any regional 
dominance by other major powers, two changes have been especially 
important: China’s shift from a centrally planned economy to a marketised 
economy; and the Weberian shift from charismatic towards legal and 
rational governmental processes.  
In these contexts, it is difficult to separate the influence of globalisation, 
however defined, from other influences. Even if we look at international 
influences generally, this imprecision remains.  
 
4  Many of these points have been made in the chapters by Christopher Clapham and Michael Liefer in 
Christopher Clapham, ed., Foreign policy making in developing states: A comparative approach 
(Westmead, Hants: Saxon House, 1977). See also Merilee Grindle, ‘Ready or not: The developing 
world and globalization’, in Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds, Governance in a globalising world 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 118–207.  
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Despite extensive academic discussion of the relative importance of 
international and domestic, as well as personal factors,5 globalisation has 
exacerbated the difficulty of distinguishing domestic from foreign policy. 
China’s reforms have illustrated that it is not easy to distinguish the 
responses of foreign policy structures and processes to domestically 
initiated shifts from the responses to external changes.  
By way of introduction I discuss briefly how the sources of China’s 
foreign policies have changed. These include brief comments on how some 
of the characteristics of developing countries outlined earlier relate to 
China, notably ideology, external penetration and internal cohesion; I return 
later to others, more immediately relevant in the present context. I then 
outline the structure of foreign policy making and related changes. 
In particular, I consider some impacts of globalisation on the role of the 
state from the perspectives of the balance between state power and 
provincial and local government power, and an incipient civil society; of the 
military and the Party; and of the influence of global actors—institutions 
and other international players, including multinational companies (MNCs) 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
SOURCES OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
Specific factors important in the history of China since 1949 have shaped 
the state’s responses to external influences. While pragmatism was not 
absent, as illustrated by the early 1970s rapprochement with the US, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology was important, and at times perhaps a dominant 
factor, in shaping foreign policies. Its importance as a driving dynamic 
tended to decline, however, after China normalised international relations, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Internationally, until the 1970s and 1980s, China had a ‘dual track 
diplomacy’—one track dealing with normal interstate relations and one 
 
5  See, for example, Quanshing Zhao, Interpreting Chinese foreign policy (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), especially chapter 1.  
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dealing with inter-party ties.6 Initially, Mao Tse Tung’s belief that revolution 
was the way to prevent class-based war led to substantial support for 
national liberation movements. Consequently, party to party links included, 
in particular, material support for most Southeast Asian communist parties, 
but this support gradually came to an end over the period 1979 to 1982.  
Nevertheless, symbolically, ideology remains important. Even with the 
reform process underway, ideology remained because of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) relations with other communist parties, although 
now this is basically important only with North Korea and Vietnam. 
Moreover, ideology is still a legitimising element in China’s policy, 
including foreign policy discourse. Substantively, however, it remains at 
best mostly a marginal influence.  
For China, the history of past substantial external intrusions and 
encroachments by Western countries over long periods remains important, 
as do memories of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and its aggression 
against China in the Pacific War. The subsequent sense of threat and 
security concerns from the US, India, the USSR, Indochina, Japan and, 
following the end of the Cold War, the US again, still affects China’s 
thinking over foreign policy, and not just on Taiwan. Also important is 
China’s concern to restore its international status as a major and responsible 
power.  
It is not uncommon for developing countries in particular to use foreign 
policy initiatives for domestic political purposes. China has also pursued 
foreign policy initiatives for domestic political purposes in the past, as in 
Mao’s bombarding of Taiwan’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, in 
1958.7 Nevertheless, although China’s leaders are often accused of 
stimulating ‘Chinese nationalism’ linked to various territorial disputes, these 
claims have limited validity.  
 
6  William Heaton, ‘China and Southeast Asian communist movements: The decline of dual track 
diplomacy’, Asian Survey 22(8) 1982, pp. 779–800; and Yongjin Zhang, China in international 
society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp. 28ff.  
7  Thomas J. Christensen, Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-
American conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
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Despite the presence of various ethnic minorities, what might be termed 
‘China proper’ is basically cohesive; those minorities have little inter-
national significance. Within ‘China proper’, differences, notably in rates 
and levels of economic progress at a regional level and in regional inter-
national linkages do exist but, while increasingly important in a foreign 
policy as well as a domestic political sense, are not politically threatening.8 
Beyond ‘China proper’, Beijing remains especially sensitive to threats and 
vulnerabilities relating to sovereignty over Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet, and 
for this reason, the maintenance of sovereignty is its prime foreign policy 
priority. Also influencing its foreign policy is geography, notably China’s 
central position in the landmass of Southeast and Northeast Asia, its 
fourteen land borders, and a number more of sea borders. Many of these 
borders have until recently been disputed, and some are still contested.  
Although aid and concessional trade was an important policy instrument 
in the 1950s and 1960s, historically China’s economic weakness was a 
constraint on China’s foreign policy, and to a degree limited China’s range 
of foreign policy interests. That may still be a factor, if increasingly less so 
today.  Resource availabilities for the foreign policy institutions, however, 
have largely ceased to be a constraint.  
Given our interest in globalisation, the question remains as to when 
globalising influences started to have an impact on China’s approach to 
foreign policy. History shows that in the twentieth century China’s aim to 
modernise and be part of the international system was frequently 
articulated. This returned as the fervour of self-reliance diminished with the 
1970s reforms. In the early post-1949 period, some external influences were 
evident of the rapid changes taking place in the international environment. 
Yet at this time, the Western international system was trying to exclude a 
USSR-leaning China while, notably in the late 1960s and much of the 
1970s, a self reliant China was challenging the legitimacy of the inter-
national system.  
 
8  Shaun Breslin, ‘IR, area studies and IPE: Rethinking the study of China’s international relations’, 
CGSR Working Paper No. 94/02 (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation, University of Warwick, April 2002).  
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The challenge to the existing system changed after the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76). The decision by Deng Xiaoping to introduce the 
‘reform and opening up’ process in the latter part of the 1970s,9 in its form 
rather than its motivation, can be seen as a response to the economic and 
technological pressures that constituted at least economic globalisation.10  
The direction that Deng took in seeking economic reform could have 
been inward looking, the wish of then premier Hua Guofeng. Deng’s view 
was affected by internal political competition with Hua but that it was 
outwards directed also reflected Deng’s better appreciation of global 
changes. He recognised that China was falling behind economically and 
understood the need for China to adapt and respond to those changes to 
achieve the economic development he saw as crucial for the Party’s 
survival.  
In the post-revolution decades, the PRC sought to lead the post-colonial 
Afro-Asian nations and to identify with developing countries, encouraging 
radical action in various developing countries, mainly in Asia. Gradually, 
however, China’s position became more ambivalent. It is not a member of 
the Group of 77 developing countries (G77) nor does it want to be a leader 
or speak for the developing countries. It does, however, often represent their 
interests in international organisations. In the World Bank, China emerged 
as a responsible spokesman for the developing countries, voicing moder-
ation and pragmatism. Because it emphasised self-reliance and prudence, 
however, this was not always welcomed by the developing countries.11  
For present purposes I take the start of the globalisation influences on 
China as being reflected in China’s reform and opening up to the outside 
world of the late 1970s. Rather than challenging the legitimacy and 
rationality of the international system, China gradually accepted, willingly 
or not, that it was now a member of that international system and that 
changes to that system would have to come from within.  
 
  9  Beginning at the Third Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee in December 1978.  
10  Stuart Harris, ‘China and the pursuit of state interests in a globalising world’, Pacifica Review 13(1) 
February 2001, pp. 15–30.  
11  Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China’s participation in the IMF, the World Bank and 
GATT: Towards an economic order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), p. 132.  
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I deal with economic interdependence later. Politically, China has only a 
limited degree of direct dependence, having passed through and beyond 
direct dependence on both the Soviet Union and then in the 1980s on the 
US. China is now relatively free of the direct influence of foreign interests. 
Political penetration has not been a major issue. This is so even if anti-
Japanese and anti-US feelings sometimes emerge, usually in response to 
some external or externally-driven event. This has, at times, led to criticism 
that the foreign ministry in particular has been too conciliatory. China does 
have a dependence relationship internationally in respect of Taiwan. It 
depends upon the international community not to give diplomatic recog-
nition to Taiwan and this requires considerable foreign policy effort.  
The end of the Cold War, and the decline of global communism, 
contributed great uncertainty to China’s worldview. The international fallout 
from the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, and US unchallenged predominance 
were major contributions to this uncertainty. The Gulf War of 1991, while 
helping China to overcome the international opprobrium of 1989, also 
complicated a position that otherwise offered the benefit for China of 
removing any sense of direct threat to its security. Eventually, however, 
despite the on-off confrontation with the US, China gradually saw itself as 
playing not just a regional but a global political role, now an important 
influence on its diplomacy.  
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING STRUCTURE 
As a socialist country, the Chinese political system is based on a tripolar 
structure—the state, the Chinese Communist Party and the military, with 
the Party dominant.  
The formal party organisational structure includes the Party Congresses 
which, at the national level, unlike the early post-revolution decades, now 
meet regularly every five years. They have set the broad directions of 
policy, notably since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Between Party 
Congresses, the formal decision making power is with the Political Bureau 
(Politburo) and more particularly its Standing Committee.  
One member of the Standing Committee normally takes responsibility 
for foreign affairs as the Head of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Leading 
Small Group (FALSG), one of a number of such groups created in 1958 to 
handle particular issues. Perhaps indicating the increased importance of 
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foreign policy, in 1998, a paramount leader took over the leadership of the 
FALSG for the first time, when Jiang Zemin became the chair, with vice-
premier and ex-foreign minister Qian Qichen as deputy.  
This Party group is meant to implement and coordinate foreign policy 
decisions and has no staff of its own. It has provided a link between Party 
and state institutions and with the military through its membership (usually 
including ministerial or vice-ministerial level officials of the military and 
state ministries). Although formally not a decision making body (it is 
defined formally as a ‘decision-making consulting body’), in reality the 
FALSG plays a pivotal role in the decision making process.12 In a context in 
which coordination between political, military and economic decision-
makers has grown in importance, its policy role remains substantial; but 
coordination across groups—as across economics and politics—appears not 
always to be effective.13 
The impact of globalisation on the foreign policy making structure has 
been substantial. The importance of China’s institutions in the foreign 
policy field has varied over time, as political influences and rivalries 
changed their role. As noted earlier, in the PRC’s early decades, Mao largely 
dominated major foreign policy decisions, initially not without disagree-
ments but disagreements became less as he gradually concentrated his own 
power. A dominant role for the ‘core’ leader remained, however, until 
relatively recently at the same time as institutionalisation of decision 
making gradually increased.  
The institutional arrangements have changed over time but a high 
concentration of power remains only partly constrained by the increased 
complexity of decision making. The pressure of business is such that, other 
than major decisions, issues are handled routinely within the bureaucratic 
institutions. It remains true, however, that the paramount leader or ‘core’ 
wields the ultimate foreign policy decision making power if usually in 
 
12  Lu Ning, The dynamics of foreign policy decisionmaking in China, second edition (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2000). 
13  There is an additional LSG on Taiwan chaired by Jiang and, as with the FALSG, includes military 
representation. Cross Strait relations are not seen as foreign policy issues and the international 
aspects of Taiwan policy—ensuring the continuing international support for China’s ‘one China’ 
policy—fall more directly under the purview of the FALSG. 
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association with one or a few members of the Politburo making up ‘the 
nuclear circle’.14 That core can in practice override decisions of the 
Politburo, but this is unlikely in the event of major decisions, as on a major 
policy shift or ultimately on war and peace, if only to legitimate important 
decisions. Nevertheless, this capacity does reduce predictability in these 
areas.  
Leaders’ preferences remain important. It has been true in the past, and 
could be again, that domestic power shifts could shift foreign policy 
attitudes. Thus the last of the third generation leaders, Jiang and Zhu Rongji 
have been seen as Western oriented. Whether leaders of the fourth 
generation will pursue reform as strongly and deregulate as firmly remains a 
question. On the other hand, continuing modernisation is now widely 
accepted as basic to regime legitimacy.  
The National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) has a role in foreign policy imple- 
mentation in approving international agreements and treaties. Although 
basically a rubber stamp process until recently, it has demonstrated a degree 
of independence of late in domestic matters at least; nevertheless, it was not 
given the opportunity to debate China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) 
decision.  
There have been several major structural reorganisations of the foreign 
policy bureaucracies, from Deng’s 1976 reform at the end of the Cultural 
Revolution to those of 1992 and 1998. Thus, although, until 1998, the 
Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council provided the staff support for the 
FALSG, that office was abolished in the administrative reforms of that time 
and the task passed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA’s 
structure has long been similar to that of other foreign ministries in most 
large countries, with orthodox geographic and functional departments and 
with now some 227 overseas missions, of which 159 are national embassies 
(as against 46 just before the Cultural Revolution). Following its 
establishment in 1949, the MFA’s initial embassies were all in communist 
countries, and its early ambassadors were all from the military.15 Robert 
 
14  Lu Ning, The dynamics of foreign policy decisionmaking, p. 9. 
15  Xiaohong Lui, China’s ambassadors: The rise of diplomatic professionalism since 1949 (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2001).  
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Boardman noted in the mid 1970s that the shape of the ministry reflected no 
institutional embodiment of Party thinking on the structure of the 
international system.16 That basically remains true (see Table 1).  
TABLE 1: DEPARTMENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PRC 
General Office 
Policy Planning 
Asian Affairs 
West Asian and North African Affairs 
African Affairs 
Eastern European and Central Asian 
Affairs  
West European Affairs 
North American and Oceanian Affairs 
Latin American Affairs 
International Organisations and 
Conferences 
Arms Control 
Treaty and Law 
Information 
Protocol 
Consular Affairs 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs 
Translation and Interpretation 
Foreign Affairs Management 
Personnel 
Bureau for Retired Personnel 
Administration  
Finance 
Supervisory Bureau 
Bureau for Chinese Diplomatic Missions 
Abroad 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c401.html>. 
There are several other state organisations with major foreign policy 
roles. They include the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooper-
ation (MOFTEC),17 that has gained some strength (relative to the MFA) 
given WTO membership, for which it has established a WTO department 
and through its role as the link with the World Bank. There is also a Foreign 
Affairs Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (also serving 
the Ministry of Defence).18 The Ministry of State Security also has a less 
 
16  Robert Boardman, ‘Ideology, organisation and environment: Sources of Chinese foreign policy 
making’, in Hannes Adomeit and Robert Boardman, eds, Foreign policy making in communist 
countries: A comparative approach (Westmead: Saxon House, 1979), pp. 112–49.  
17  From 1979 to 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. It had other bureaucratic 
forms before 1979.  
18  The International Liaison Department was influential when Party to Party relations were important 
but with the end of the Cold War, and despite extending its links with non-communist parties, it now 
has less influence.  
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than transparent foreign policy agenda. Xinhua News Agency maintains a 
large overseas presence to perform, in addition to normal information and 
propaganda functions, provision of intelligence information in raw form 
circulated among senior officials.19  
Intellectuals and think tanks have also grown in importance since the 
early 1980s, in number and scope of their participation. The State Council 
and both major ministries have their own think tanks and there are also 
several within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and at 
major universities.20 There are also a number of provincial research centres, 
notably in Shanghai.21  
As well as increased involvement by other ministries in economic 
exchanges internationally, there are various governmental or semi-
governmental agencies which are involved in international activities. These 
range from the Central Bank to various export–import corporations, as well 
as People’s Friendship Associations and the outreach activities of Chinese 
institutes of international and strategic affairs and studies. These, however, 
are basically within the control of the Chinese government or more 
specifically the Party.  
The role of the military in foreign policy decision making is mainly 
exercised not through the Ministry of Defence, which has no policy making 
function, but through a Party organisation, the Central Military Commission 
(CMC), whereas the MFA works to the State Council.22 The CMC’s role 
has been substantially affected by economic globalisation and its overall 
influence reduced. Through its General Staff Department, it does liaise with 
foreign military establishments and has a growing foreign affairs bureau. 
Moreover, the military is still influential in defence policy, and in particular 
areas, notably on Taiwan, border disputes and other aspects of China’s 
 
19  It acted as an interim embassy in Hong Kong until reunification was completed.  
20  Zhao, Interpreting Chinese foreign policy, pp. 106–7. See also Michael Pillsbury, ‘China’s research 
institutes’, Report to the US–China Commission, 18 October 2001, <www.uscc.gov/cri.pdf>. 
21  See Lu Ning, The dynamics of foreign policy decisionmaking, pp. 141–5. A useful run down on the 
Beijing and Shanghai research institutes is given in the introduction to Banning Garrett, ‘China 
faces, debates, the contradictions of globalisation’, Asian Survey 41(3) May–June 2001, pp. 410–11.  
22  There is also a less important Central Military Commission under the Defence Department.  
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sovereignty, in relations with the US and on military purchases of arms. It 
remains a member of the FALSG and although still a member of the 
Politburo, with the now greater civilian control of the military it currently 
has no member on its Standing Committee.  
In the post-revolution period, most of China’s leaders were from the 
military (usually political cadres) and many remained influential after 
retirement as ‘elders’ seen as defending the ‘revolution’. The PLA’s position 
was reinforced by its ‘stabilising’ role during the Cultural Revolution and 
then during the 1989 crisis. The military also became more involved 
immediately after Deng, the last leader with military credentials, died. The 
subsequent decline in political involvement has come from several sources. 
Principally, however, two sources have been central in light of the Gulf War 
and in Yugoslavia: its own concern to increase its institutional profess-
sionalism and to modernise the military in the light of global technological 
developments in military matters; and a consequence of the greater priority 
given by China to economic development and the related implications for 
foreign relations.  
In specific contexts, the military’s interest in arms sales to Pakistan and 
Iran had caused problems internationally for China and led to greater 
civilian control and enhanced responsibilities in this area for MFA and 
MOFTEC (on export controls). More generally, the PLA supported eco-
nomic reform and opening up but also recognised the associated non-
military aspects of security. In particular, it has recognised the imperative of 
a peaceful international environment for economic development but has 
articulated its concerns about economic interdependence and economic 
security.  
The PLA has shown itself sensitive to international opinion in order to 
maintain the foreign investment inflow it accepts as important for economic 
development.23 There have been occasions, however, when groups within or 
linked to the PLA have indicated their displeasure with particular policy 
stances, as when a group of retired generals wrote to Jiang protesting what 
 
23  Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The influence of the gun: China’s Central Military Commission and its 
relationship with the military, party and state decision-making systems’, in David Lampton, ed., The 
making of Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of reform, 1978–2000 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), p. 79.  
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they saw as ‘soft’ policies towards the US. Overall, however, MFA has 
become more important in security affairs including establishing a division 
on arms control and prevailing on the question of membership of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) against some opposition in the 
PLA.  
For several reasons, including the size of the country, provincial and 
often municipal governments maintain foreign affairs offices. They are 
funded locally but controlled jointly by Beijing and the province. Especially 
since the end of the Cold War, as economic developments moved up the 
foreign policy agenda, their role has changed from simply implementing 
Beijing’s policies to pursuing provincial interests ranging from tourism, 
receiving provincial visitors and improving their image in the international 
community, largely for economic reasons.  
To this end, provincial and municipal leaders travel frequently, often 
accompanying the large number of provincial trade delegations travelling 
overseas each year. Many of the provinces have also established companies 
or overseas offices for investment and trade purposes.  
In the economic field, organisations other than the provincial foreign 
affairs offices, such as the Foreign Economic and Trade Commissions 
(FETCs), tend to dominate.24 Decentralised economic management was 
already a feature of China’s post-1949 economy but, following the reform, 
considerable decentralisation of economic decision making expanded to 
where local governments are relatively autonomous actors. This was, 
among other things, due to the incapacity of central planning authorities 
during and immediately following the Mao period and not just due to 
globalisation. Several writers have suggested that China is now in practice a 
de facto federal system.25 In particular areas this has important con-
sequences for decision making, notably with respect to foreign direct 
 
24  Peter Cheung and James Tang, ‘The external relations of China’s provinces’, in Lampton, ed., The 
making of Chinese foreign and security policy, pp. 91–120.  
25  For example, see Yasheng Huang, Inflation and investment controls in China: The political economy 
of central–local relations during the reform era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
See also Yangian Zhang, ‘Institutionalising defacto federalism in post-Deng China’, in Hung-mao 
Tien and Yun-han Chu, eds, China under Jiang Zemin (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2000), pp. 215–32. 
14  STUART HARRIS  
 
investment. With the gradual removal of controls on the provinces, nearly 
all foreign direct investment is now negotiated with and channelled through 
local governments rather than through Beijing.  
This does not mean that ultimately the central authorities cannot control 
the local governments through political action but central control over the 
resources available to provincial leaders has greatly diminished. That the 
centre has to seek to achieve its objectives increasingly by seeking cooper-
ation means that its decision making has to be more responsive to provincial 
interests, including in its foreign policy decisions that might impinge on 
those interests. Given the critical role of foreign investment, often account-
ing for more than 50 per cent of a province’s outlays on capital projects, 
competition for foreign investment is a major but not the only provincial 
interest in China’s foreign policy. More generally, especially in the coastal 
and border provinces, the provinces have developed international links with 
neighbours and with the global economy; sister city and sister province 
arrangements are one example. Foreign diplomatic and security policies, 
however, are still in the hands of Beijing and lobbying Beijing by a 
province—Fujian or Shanghai over Taiwan relations or Jilin over the 
Tumen River project—is understood to be common.  
Considerable resources are invested in foreign relations. Precise staff 
numbers are not available but home based officials in the MFA now number 
around 2000, with estimated diplomatic staff overseas numbering well over 
2000. There is also a ‘service’ contingent (translators, drivers etc.) of around 
6000. Attached to the MFA is the Institute of Foreign Affairs that, while 
doing some research, is concerned primarily with people to people rela-
tionships, and the more research oriented China Institute for International 
Studies (CIIS), while the Chinese Institute for International and Strategic 
Studies (CIISS), attached to the military, undertakes research for several 
departments. The important China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations (CICIR) is under the State Council. In addition, although not 
linked directly to the department, friendship associations exist in all 
provinces as well as at the national level.  
More closely linked to the national departments are the provincial 
foreign affairs offices (FAOs). In 2001, the largest FAO, in Shanghai, had 
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238 staff; in Guandong, the FETC with 230 staff, was twice as big as the 
FAO.26 Guandong’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, with 108 staff, was 
also larger. Provincial expenditures in these fields has increased greatly 
since the reform, particularly in the coastal and border provinces. In Jiangsu, 
one of the larger spenders, it increased from 3.7 million yuan in 1978 to 59 
million yuan in 1996.  
In looking at how far China’s decision making is constrained by glo-
balisation, it is difficult to distinguish between change in general and 
globalisation in particular and also between constraints accepted volun-
tarily, as in membership of international institutions, and those that are 
unavoidable.  
ECONOMIC REFORM 
As noted earlier, China’s desire for modernisation is not new. It has 
characterised much of the twentieth century for China. To pursue mod-
ernisation, the PRC tried two methods—following Soviet centralised 
economy methods and then autarchy—before deciding on market 
methods.  
Under Mao, the quest for modernisation continued but, internationally, 
economic development was also an instrument of political and strategic 
policy, both through China’s substantial aid provisions and its concessional 
trade. This changed with the Deng reforms, the immediate impact of which 
was in economic relations. Deng’s reforms meant the acceptance of foreign 
direct investment and the increasing participation in the international trading 
system with the gradual reorientation to the market.  
These changes were not accepted easily. The opening up to the 
international economic system was a switch from the closed approach to the 
outside world of the ideological radicalism of the Cultural Revolution; the 
question of its compatibility with Marxist thought was important to much of 
the elite. There was thus an extended debate within China about the 
consistency of the concept of comparative advantage with Marxist theory. 
Gradually the idea that trade was mutually beneficial, and not ‘exploitative 
 
26  Cheung and Tang, ‘The external relations of China’s provinces’, p. 101. 
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and immiserising’ was accepted and is now generally not in dispute.27 This 
is an example of cognitive learning in the sense of a changed understanding 
of the way the world works.  
Nevertheless, this process involved difficult choices for China. In a 
globalising world economy, restricting economic activity to within national 
borders increasingly limits the gains from trade and the restricting nation’s 
prosperity but at the same time opening up to the international system 
increases vulnerability to conditions beyond national control.  
The idea of economic interdependence was criticised by China in the UN 
in the mid 1980s yet was accepted as unavoidable by the mid 1990s. And 
globalisation was ultimately acknowledged by Jiang a decade later as ‘a 
natural outcome of world economic development’ from which China could 
gain.28  
China is now significantly dependent, however, upon the international 
economic system and especially on the US and Japan to meet its 
modernisation objectives. This means that to achieve those objectives it has 
had to change its domestic institutions and become subject to outside 
influences, including meeting the requirements of international institutions. 
China now has a large export surplus, notably with the US. It is also heavily 
dependent on foreign direct investment.  
Since the objective of the reforms in practice was the relaxation of 
centralised regulation of economic activities, first in agriculture and then 
more widely, some reduction in state control was inevitable. For example, 
trade with China before the reform program was carried out by less than 20 
state trading agencies; World Bank figures suggest it is now conducted by 
well over 200,000 private traders.29  
 
27  See Stuart Harris, ‘China’s role in WTO and APEC’, in David Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds, 
China rising: Nationalism and interdependence (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 134–55 and the 
literature cited there.  
28  Jiang Zemin, Address to the 21st Century Forum, Beijing, FBIS-CHI-2000-0613 (13 June 2000).  
29  Cited in Deepak Bhattasali and Masahiro Kawaii, ‘Implications of China’s accession to the WTO’, 
in Hanns Gunther Hilpert and Rene Haak, eds, Japan and China: Cooperation, competition and 
conflict (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 74.  
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Moreover, to gain the foreign investment needed not just for the capital it 
brings but for the technology and know-how that comes with it, policies 
have to be such as to attract investors. These include political stability, 
taxation, foreign exchange and related regulations attractive to investors, as 
well as the economic stability that comes with appropriate monetary and 
fiscal policies. In addition, it meant that China had to show itself as a mature 
and responsible member of the international community and fit within the 
international rules and norms of that community.  
Some of the potential vulnerabilities have changed China’s ideas of 
national security in two respects. Greater emphasis is now placed on 
economic security as a national concern. In this respect, threats to China’s 
security would come from the political pressure that could be put on it in 
economic terms as well as from downturns in international economic 
activity. In addition, however, while domestic stability and unity are critical 
to regime legitimacy, economic development is itself a crucial element of 
the regime’s legitimacy.  
The desire for economic development continues to animate China’s 
foreign policy but recognition of what is involved in its effective manage-
ment has also increased. Jiang, pointing to the need for better macro-
economic regulation and control, has pressed government employees to 
study and understand fully issues such as macroeconomic policy.30  
In responding to economic interdependence, it has been argued that 
whether learning is involved or not does not matter—it is a predicament that 
China has to face and what matters is how it copes.31 This is not the 
argument here. I believe that understanding the beliefs held by China’s elites 
are important if we want to predict future responses. I would argue that 
learning in the international field has gone beyond adaptive learning 
meeting expedient needs while those temporary needs exist, to cognitive 
learning that has internalised the understandings. In responding to 
 
30  Jiang Zemin, in a foreword to a Chinese macroeconomic textbook. FBIS-CHI-2002-0602 (2 June 
2002).  
31  Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, ‘Empowered and restrained: Chinese foreign policy in the age of 
economic interdependence’, in Lampton, ed., The making of Chinese foreign and security policy, 
pp. 191–229, at p. 228. 
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globalisation, China’s leaders have abandoned many deep-rooted assump-
tions about the nature of the international system.  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The need to adjust to the rules and norms of the international system, and 
membership of its institutions, was part of the influence that greater 
international participation forced upon China and which led to openness 
to, or intensification of, globalisation pressures. This has had important 
implications scarcely recognised even by Deng. 
The Chinese move from self-reliance to opening up was especially 
difficult in respect of participation in international institutions. China moved 
slowly but deliberately to study the implications for China. Political 
motivations were important, notably the denial of Taiwan’s participation. 
So, however, were more practical issues. One benefit seen from partici-
pation in the financial institutions was to understand how the international 
financial system worked. Understanding of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the international trading system was gained 
from sending Chinese officials to participate in GATT commercial policy 
courses and to observe GATT processes before seeking membership.   
Some of its concerns about its vulnerability will be met by the rules of 
the international institutions concerned with economic issues. China became 
a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
1980. Both imposed forms of conditionality on Beijing. Eventually, in the 
mid 1980s, China sought membership of the GATT and became a member 
in 2002. In accepting the obligations of membership of the GATT/WTO, 
China has accepted many constraints on its freedom to manage economic 
activity. Notably, these constraints require it to move rapidly towards a 
largely nondiscriminatory system of rules and regulations that prevent it 
favouring unduly domestic producers against foreigners but also prevent it 
discriminating among its trading partners. Its expectation is that this will 
also apply in reverse to its economic partners.  
China’s vulnerability to foreign state-inspired insecurity has also 
diminished as its economy has grown, simply because its own capacity for 
retaliation has increased. It is now vulnerable, however, to the ups and 
downs of the market, and particularly the financial market, for which other 
counters are needed. Consequently, Chinese leaders maintain large foreign 
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exchange reserves and in the light of their experience in the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis, will move slowly to deregulate their exchange rate.  
China joined all the major international institutions associated directly or 
indirectly with the UN as well as many regional economic, social and 
strategic institutions. It has shown no sign of being disruptive of their 
activities. On the contrary it has become a supporter of the status quo. It sits 
on the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank and is on the 
Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Moreover, 
it has established administrative bureaucracies in Beijing that institutionalise 
those relationships.  
WHO INFLUENCES AND MAKES FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS? 
It was noted earlier that globalisation blurs the distinction between what is 
domestic and what is international.  
I have discussed the major official interests in China and the question 
remains of how other interests can or do intrude in the process of identi-
fying, deciding and implementing foreign policies. I noted that despite 
considerable institutionalisation of foreign policy formulation and imple-
mentation, the Chinese leadership core remains central to the process.  
The technical complexity of decision making has increased, however, 
and the range of foreign policy issues facing China’s leaders has expanded 
greatly. Consequently, the leaders cannot operate as was once the case under 
Mao. Moreover, China’s perception of its national interest has changed, or 
at least the understanding of how to pursue that national interest.  
This is clearest for its economic interests. This understanding has come 
from and been reinforced in several ways. While globalisation has made 
available a mass of information relevant to economic development, the need 
for analysis and interpretation has also grown. China has met this need in a 
number of ways. As noted earlier, its participation in international 
institutions was designed in part for learning purposes, with the major 
international institutions being important influences to ministries and think 
tanks, at times to the point of stimulating criticism of the influence of those 
institutions.  
Advice from multinational corporations and other foreign businesses and 
from other ‘friends’ was also important. Perhaps most important has been 
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the influence of overseas Chinese, and in particular those from, first, the 
close contact of Beijing with leading Chinese businessmen from Hong 
Kong and Singapore and then increasingly the demonstration effect of 
Taiwanese businesses, both taking advantage of their cultural links. 
Returning overseas educated Chinese students, first in communist countries 
and subsequently and much more intensively in the West, have also had 
considerable influence.  
Economic interests themselves have a variety of ways by which they can 
affect decision making. In China, personal linkages by business leaders 
appear important, as well as through formal economic institutions, political 
consultation committees and peoples’ congresses or established interest 
groups. Analysts frequently note the close links of Hong Kong entre-
preneurs such as Li Kashing of Hutchison Whampoa with China’s leaders. 
While Li may see this as business as usual, conspiracy theorists see Li being 
used by Beijing in its global strategy.32 While lobbying at provincial levels 
apparently takes place, and while during WTO negotiations, pressures from 
particular industries and their related ministries were strong, how far 
‘interest groups’ are involved in influencing foreign policy decision making 
is not clear.  
Although China’s official foreign policy institutes have themselves 
become more important, other institutions are also influential, notably 
CASS with several of its institutes concerned with international relations. 
Many sub-national institutions are also important, notably the Shanghai 
Institute of International Studies. The growth of relatively new issues 
involved in the international agenda—drugs, terrorism and international 
crime—has added to the range of interest groups. This has helped to shift 
China’s foreign policy decision making from a purely vertical to a partly 
horizontal process, even though that shift still has a long way to go.  
China’s membership of international organisations (governmental and 
non-governmental) is very large and has provided a major conduit for 
information and ideas. Domestic ‘civil society’,33 including NGOs is only 
 
32  See for example, Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, ‘Inside the ring’, Washington Times, 12 July 
2002.  
33  Comparisons with Western experience need care: ‘social organisations’ in China are quasi-
governmental and need to have an official ‘parent’ and are often government funded. This can be 
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just starting to have any influence. In some fields, notably social issues such 
as the environment, health and women’s rights, many Chinese NGOs have 
emerged. On these issues, NGOs have had an effect by pursuing subjects on 
which they are in communication with overseas NGOs.  
This has been facilitated by the great expansion of Internet access that 
has substantially reduced the government’s monopolistic control on inform-
ation, including information globally available. China has promoted the use 
of the Internet, although it tries to control the uses to which it is put. The 
Xinhua News Agency says it has 280,000 websites and some 38 million 
Internet users.34 Most use, however, would be through Internet cafes, 
periodically subjected to sharp crackdowns.  
China’s social organisations are mostly quasi-official and have to register 
with the government. A few business associations, such as the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce, play a role in international com-
munication. Civil society also includes academic bodies that are concerned 
with international affairs, such as the Beijing Society of Comparative 
International Studies, which has close links with the Beijing Academy of 
Social Sciences and with officials and ex-officials of the MFA. Any 
influence on foreign political policy, however, is usually indirect through 
personal connections and somewhat marginal.  
The government requires that civil society should reflect ‘constructive 
attitudes and ways’, foreign political and security issues are ‘sensitive’ as 
concerning the security of the state and the regime, and there are restricted 
or forbidden areas of discussion, as on the Taiwan question or on the role of 
the PLA in determining foreign policy.35 At the same time, there is now 
considerable discussion of many issues of foreign political policy 
importance, as for example, arms control and disarmament. Media 
 
advantageous or constricting in the Chinese context depending upon individual circumstances. See 
Wang Yizhou, ‘China’, in Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Governance and civil society in a global age 
(Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2001), pp. 94–95; and although now a little dated, 
Zhang Ye, ‘Chinese NGOs: A survey report’, in Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Emerging civil society in 
the Asia-Pacific community (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 1995), pp. 93–107.  
34  Associated Press, Beijing, 15 July 2002.  
35  Wang Yizhou, ‘China’, pp.102–3.  
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discussion of economic issues, including globalisation, WTO membership 
and US–China relations has been vigorous. A recent study has also 
indicated that media presentation has been ‘balanced’ in the sense that both 
positive and negative arguments are available.36 
The growing role of domestic institutions in the foreign policy making 
process was noted earlier and since this involves increased bureau-
cratisation, an important question relates to their competence. Although 
generally in the early post-revolution decades, the quality of China’s 
administrative and management staff was poor, this was not entirely true in 
the foreign policy institutions.  
The foreign policy bureaucracies, however, have been where major 
changes have taken place. Even before the Cultural Revolution, in part due 
to the special interest of Zhou Enlai in the quality of foreign ministry staff, 
Chinese diplomats became more than just ideological evangelists. A number 
became adept in negotiating skills and Western languages and many were 
capable of pursuing normal diplomatic activities including reporting world 
affairs at a more sophisticated and professional level. Even so, political 
loyalty took precedence over competence.37  
On how far leaders have differences on foreign policy issues, little 
reliable information is available. Within democratic centralism, disputes 
among China’s leaders should not become apparent, and consensus is 
usually pursued vigorously. Yet from time to time rumours emerge of strong 
differences (particularly over China’s policy towards Taiwan) over attitudes 
to the US and to a degree over WTO entry.  
International influences come into China from a large variety of sources, 
but particularly through China’s reform and opening up, the growth of the 
media and technological change in communications. Now many national 
and regional officials, teachers, scholars, intellectuals, journalists, and 
 
36  ‘Perspectives toward the United States in selected newspapers of the People’s Republic of China’, 
Spring 2000 Report for the US–China Security Review Commission (College Park, Maryland: 
University of Maryland’s Institute for Global Chinese Affairs and the Department of 
Communication, 30 May 2002), p. 5.  
37  Xiaohong Lui, China’s ambassadors, pp. 105, 202.  
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commentators are sensitive to global developments and how China needs to 
fit within the emerging global community.  
CONCLUSION 
For developing countries, the impact of globalisation is more difficult to 
manage than for developed countries, institutionally and for political 
governance reasons. China’s developing country characteristics show up 
less in its foreign political policy making mechanisms, and in the 
substantial resources it devotes to foreign affairs, than in the rigidity of its 
domestic legal and political institutions. This weakness starts with that of 
the Party organisation itself, especially in the rural areas and in the rapidly 
expanding private economy. In part this comes from the fact that 
governments tend to have a degree of monopoly over international 
political relationships but not over economic relations. It is also assoc-
iated, in the economic field, however, with the inevitable decentralisation 
of decision making associated with the growth of the economy. The 
economic power and global linkages of regional and local authorities that 
has resulted has undermined to a considerable degree the authority of the 
central state. 
In its foreign political relations, we have noted changes from the Mao era 
with its highly centralised policy making processes under Mao’s domination 
and with a considerable influence of military veterans to what has been 
termed horizontal authoritarianism, with more players, more diverse issues, 
less rigidity and more flexibility. In both the political and the economic field 
we have seen a considerable increase in the institutionalisation and 
professionalism of the processes of foreign policy decision making. In the 
political field, while there is more collective decision making, and a wider 
range of influences, the Party is still well in control of major directions of 
policy and on important issues of policy the leadership ‘core’ is still able to 
dominate.  
So far as the role of the state is concerned, I noted earlier that in 
economic affairs, the reform and opening up process and the related 
decentralising of the economy meant that direct controls were greatly 
reduced. The government, in consequence, has to rely increasingly on 
indirect controls—in the economic field, macroeconomic monetary and 
fiscal policy instruments and international cooperation. In the political 
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field, it has also increasingly sought international cooperation—globally 
as in arms control or regionally as with drugs and, effectively, on 
terrorism.  
The learning process has been important and substantial. China has 
become increasingly aware of the importance of acting in ways that are 
consistent with the role of a responsible major power. There remain 
important differences among the elites but the dominance of the reformers 
has been largely maintained. In recent decades, China has moved from an 
emphasis on political-strategic concerns to a more all-embracing view of 
national interests, to accept that the international system is not invariably 
hostile; and to recognise the advantages of flexibility and cooperation, 
especially but not only in economics.  
In doing so China was obliged to reject some fundamental propositions 
that had been strongly held previously, such as on issues of international 
economic cooperation and interdependence.  
While there are still opponents of the pace and extent of economic 
reform, the reform program benefitted from the reaction to the anarchy of 
the Cultural Revolution and the market economy appears to have wide-
spread public support. Even those losing from the reform process seem to 
blame local officials rather than the leaders in Beijing.  
China is now basically a full participant in the international system. 
While the domestic requirements of the reform program—the need for a 
peaceful and stable international environment—has been a major influence 
on China’s foreign policy, Chinese leaders travel extensively and even if to 
shore up support for their interests in ‘one China’ or other policies they 
cannot ignore what they hear or see. Together with the greater pro-
fessionalism of the foreign policy bureaucracies, working in a more 
pluralised environment, China has moved towards a greater perception of 
common interests and acceptance of the rules and norms of the international 
institutions. Under influences that include, critically, those of globalisation, 
it shows many signs of becoming a participant not just in the international 
system but in international society.  
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